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Abstract 
This paper examines the impacts of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) – which substantially 
increased insurance coverage through regulations, mandates, subsidies, and Medicaid expansions 
– on behaviors related to future health risks after three years. Using data from the Behavioral
Risk Factor Surveillance System and an identification strategy that leverages variation in pre-
ACA uninsured rates and state Medicaid expansion decisions, we show that the ACA increased
preventive care utilization along several dimensions, but also increased risky drinking. These
results are driven by the private portions of the law, as opposed to the Medicaid expansion. We
also conduct subsample analyses by income and age.
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Introduction 
 Emerging literatures in health economics and health policy seek to evaluate the impacts 
of the primary components of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), including the individual mandate, 
subsidized Marketplace coverage, and state Medicaid expansions, that were implemented in 
2014 (Obama 2014). While the stated goals of the ACA include improving access to health care 
in order to improve health outcomes, economists have long understood that expansions of 
insurance coverage could plausibly influence investments in health capital in either direction 
(e.g. Cawley and Ruhm 2011; Barbaresco et al. 2015). The purpose of this paper is to estimate 
the impacts of the ACA on behaviors related to future health risks. These include both behaviors 
that reduce future risks (such as utilization of preventive medical services) and those that 
increase risks (such as smoking and drinking). Our primary innovation is to use data from the 
2011-2016 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), which gives us a longer post-
treatment period than prior studies and therefore a greater ability to detect effects. 
The net effects of health insurance coverage on both preventive care utilization and risky 
health behaviors depend on the relative roles of out-of-pocket prices, ex ante moral hazard, and 
income effects. By lowering the portion of medical costs borne by the patient, health insurance 
reduces the price of preventive care as well as medications and counseling services related to 
risky behaviors. The direct price effect should therefore work in the direction of healthier 
lifestyles along both dimensions. However, expansions in insurance coverage could also lead to 
less healthy lifestyles through ex ante moral hazard, the phenomenon in which the reduction in 
financial risk associated with unhealthy behavior incentivizes such behavior. While ex ante 
moral hazard has most often been examined in the context of risky health behaviors, the same 
logic could also apply to a failure to adhere to screening and vaccination guidelines (Barbaresco 
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et al. 2015; Simon et al. 2017). In addition, income effects from gaining free or subsidized 
coverage could influence behaviors in potentially conflicting ways. Consumers may choose to 
spend money they had budgeted for the direct purchase of medical care on alcohol, cigarettes, 
and junk food or, conversely, on healthy food and gym memberships (Simon et al. 2017). 
Following Courtemanche et al. (2017, 2018a), we estimate difference-in-difference-in-
differences (DDD) models to evaluate the impact of the ACA, where the differences come from 
time, state Medicaid expansion status, and local area pretreatment uninsured rate. Most of the 
previous ACA literature tends to focus on the effects of the ACA Medicaid expansions using a 
simpler difference-in-differences (DD) model that compares changes over time in Medicaid 
expansion states to changes in non-expansion states. We seek to identify the impact of the other 
components of the ACA as well, such as the individual mandate and subsidized Marketplace 
coverage.1 This is inherently more challenging because these components were implemented in 
every state simultaneously. Our third difference addresses this issue by exploiting an additional 
layer of plausibly exogenous variation arising from the fact that the national components of the 
ACA should provide the most intense “treatment” in local areas with the highest pre-reform 
uninsured rates.  
The BRFSS is well-suited for our study because it includes a number of questions related 
to health behaviors and other outcomes of interest. In addition, it is large enough to precisely 
estimate the effects of state policies, with over 300,000 observations per year. Our sample 
consists of nonelderly adults included in the 2011–2016 waves of the BRFSS. 
Our results provide some evidence of both improved access to preventive services and 
the presence of ex ante moral hazard. For the full sample of non-elderly adults, the ACA 
                                                          
1 Our results could also partially reflect the ACA’s employer mandate, which took effect in 2015 and became 
stronger in 2016. See https://obamacarefacts.com/obamacare-employer-mandate/.  
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increased several aspects of preventive care utilization (well-patient checkups, pap and HIV 
tests, and mammograms) but also risky drinking in non-Medicaid-expansion states, with the 
effects being statistically indistinguishable in Medicaid expansion states. No statistically 
significant results emerge for flu shots, body mass index (BMI), drinks per month, smoking, or 
exercising. Event study regressions provide support for our econometric approach while also 
revealing some evidence of additional ex ante moral hazard – greater smoking and less exercise 
– in the ACA’s third year. Finally, we conduct subsample analyses by income and age. The gains 
in preventive care are largely concentrated among the lower half of the income distribution, 
while the results suggesting ex ante moral hazard are clearer among the upper half. The increases 
in pap and HIV tests are concentrated among those below the sample median age, while the rise 
in mammograms is driven by those above the median age.  
These findings with three years of post-reform data build on analyses by Courtemanche 
et al. (2018a) and Simon et al. (2017) that also used the BRFSS but only through 2015. 
Moreover, Courtemanche et al. (2018a) only examine a single preventive care outcome (well-
patient checkups), while Simon et al. (2017) only estimate causal effects of the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion. 
 
Literature Review 
The RAND Health Insurance Experiment of the 1970s–1980s provides some of the first 
causally interpretable evidence on the impacts of health insurance coverage on health behaviors. 
Randomized variation in the generosity of insurance coverage through the experiment did not 
lead to statistically significant changes in smoking behavior or weight (Brook et al. 1983). There 
is also a large literature focusing on Medicaid expansions prior to the ACA. In terms of risky 
health behaviors, Medicaid expansions for children and pregnant women in the 1980s and 1990s 
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reduced low birthweight (Currie and Gruber 1996a), but increased smoking among pregnant 
women (Dave, Kaestner, and Wehby 2015).  
Studies of the more recent randomized 2008 Oregon Medicaid lottery found that 
Medicaid coverage increased use of preventive services but did not have statistically significant 
effects on smoking or obesity (Finkelstein et al. 2012; Baicker et al. 2013). Kolstad and 
Kowalski (2012) found that the expansion of coverage resulting from the 2006 Massachusetts 
insurance reform increased utilization of some types of preventive care, while Courtemanche and 
Zapata (2014) found that it reduced BMI but did not significantly influence smoking. Among 
seniors, Dave and Kaestner (2009) documented slightly worsening smoking and drinking habits 
as a result of gaining Medicare coverage, while Card et al. (2008) found mixed results for 
preventive care. 
In terms of the ACA, one strand of the literature examines the 2010 mandate for insurers 
to cover dependents up to 26 years old. Evidence suggests that this dependent coverage 
expansion did not impact the utilization of preventive services, but did reduce BMI (Barbaresco 
et al. 2015). Another strand of literature examines the major components of the ACA that were 
implemented in 2014. Simon et al. (2017) used the BRFSS and found that the ACA Medicaid 
expansion increased some aspects of preventive care use among low income childless adults. 
However, they did not find any evidence of effects on risky health behaviors. Similarly, 
Courtemanche et al. (2018a) showed that the full ACA increased well-patient checkups, but 
found no evidence of effects on risky health behaviors. Cotti et al. (2017) use scanner, rather 
than survey, data and find little evidence that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion influenced 
purchases of snack foods, soda, cigarettes, or alcohol. 
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Relative to the previous literature, we make two main contributions. First, to our 
knowledge, we provide the first causally interpretable evidence on the effects of the ACA on 
health behaviors after three years. Simon, Soni, and Cawley (2017), Courtemanche et al. 
(2018a), and Cotti et al. (2017) only used two years of post-treatment data. Since none of these 
studies found effects on risky behaviors, the addition of the third post-treatment year will 
ultimately prove essential for documenting any ex ante moral hazard. The importance of the third 
year is not surprising. Enrollment in the Marketplaces has continued to rise each year since the 
ACA took effect, and the estimated gain in insurance coverage from the fully implemented ACA 
rose from 6.5 percentage points in 2014 to 9.7 percentage points in 2015 to 11.8 percentage 
points in 2016 (Courtemanche et al., 2018b). Moreover, a long literature on economic models of 
addiction suggests that health habits – particularly those related to addictive substances – can 
take time to adjust in response to changing incentives (Cawley and Ruhm, 2011).   
Second, we also conduct, to our knowledge, the first investigation of the effects of the 
fully implemented ACA (including the provisions related to private coverage) on a broad 
spectrum of preventive care measures. Simon, Soni, and Cawley (2017) examined several 
preventive care outcomes but only offered causally interpretable results for the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion. Courtemanche et al. (2018a) estimated the impacts of both the private and Medicaid 
expansion components of the ACA, but only considered one preventive care measure (well-
patient checkups).  
 
Data 
We use data from the BRFSS, an annual telephone survey conducted by the US Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in conjunction with state health departments. The 
BRFSS collects information on various types of health behaviors for all 50 states and the District 
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of Columbia. Having a large sample size (more than 300,000 adults per year) is critical because 
the ACA affected insurance coverage for only a fraction of the population, thus limiting 
plausible effect sizes.  
Our sample consists of BRFSS respondents 19-64 years old who were interviewed 
between 2011 and 2016. Older individuals were excluded because the ACA was not intended to 
affect their health care coverage. We start our sample with calendar year 2011 because this is the 
first year in which the BRFSS included cell phones in its sampling frame. Thus our 2011-2016 
sample period gives us a total of three years of pre-reform data and three years of post-reform 
data. 
We examine ten dependent variables related to preventive care or risky behaviors. Our 
preventive care outcomes are indicators for a recent well-patient checkup (e.g. physical), flu 
shot, pap test, and mammogram in the past year, and whether the person was ever tested for 
HIV.2 Our risky health behavior outcomes are a binary indicator for whether one smokes, a 
count of alcoholic drinks consumed in the past month, an indicator for whether one was a risky 
drinker in the last month,3 a continuous variable measuring the respondents’ body weight in the 
form of BMI,4 and a binary variable for any exercise in the last month.5 Smoking, drinking, and 
                                                          
2 The BRFSS survey questions we use to build the preventive care outcomes are: “About how long has it been since 
you last visited a doctor for a routine checkup?” A routine checkup is a general physical exam, not an exam for a 
specific injury, illness, or condition; during the past 12 months, “have you had either a flu shot or a flu vaccine that 
was sprayed in your nose?”; “how long has it been since you had your last Pap test?”; “how long has it been since 
you had your last mammogram?”; and “not counting tests you may have had as part of blood donation, have you 
ever been tested for HIV? Include testing fluid from your mouth”. 
3 According to the CDC (https://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/fact-sheets/alcohol-use.htm), risky drinking is defined as 
consuming 60 or more (32 or more) drinks in the last month for men (women), or having any episodes of binge 
drinking in the last month. Binge drinking is defined as having five or more drinks in one occasion for men and four 
or more drinks in one occasion for women. We also considered using binge drinking as an outcome; the results were 
very similar to those for risky drinking. 
4 BMI is defined as weight in kilograms divided by height in squared meters. We also considered a binary outcome 
for obesity (BMI ≥ 30) and the results were qualitatively similar to those for BMI. The BRFSS computes BMI based 
on respondents’ reported height and weight. Self-reported height and weight are widely known to suffer from 
measurement error, but attempting to correct for this error rarely has a meaningful effect on regression estimates 
(Courtemanche et al., 2015).  
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obesity-related behaviors were selected because they represent three of the leading causes of 
preventable death in the United States, costing 467,000, 64,000, and 216,000 lives respectively 
per year as of 2005 (Danaei et al. 2009; Cawley and Ruhm 2012).  
Our analysis includes controls for demographic characteristics, household characteristics, 
economic characteristics, and measures that capture state differences in the implementation of 
the ACA. Specifically, we use BRFSS information to construct dummy variables for age groups, 
gender, race/ethnicity, marital status, education, household income, number of children in the 
household, whether the respondent reports their primary occupation to be a student, and whether 
the respondent is unemployed. Additionally, we use data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to 
control for seasonally adjusted monthly state unemployment rate. Finally, following 
Courtemanche et al. (2017, 2018a), we include dummy variables for whether states set up their 
own insurance exchanges and whether these exchanges experienced glitches (KFF 2014; 
Kowalski 2014). 
One of our treatment variables, measuring the “dose” of the ACA’s impact, is the 
uninsured rate in the respondent’s “local area” in the pre-reform year of 2013, computed within 
our BRFSS sample. Defining local areas is not straightforward since the BRFSS does not contain 
narrow geographic identifiers such as county. Beyond state of residence, the only geographic 
information available in the BRFSS is an “area type” variable indicating whether the respondent 
resides in the center city of an MSA, outside the center city of an MSA but inside the county 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 For the risky health behaviors we used the following questions and pre-calculated variables in the BFRSS; “do you 
now smoke cigarettes every day, some days, or not at all?”; the calculated total number of alcoholic beverages 
consumed per month, the calculated BMI based on questions regarding height and weight, “During the past month, 
other than your regular job, did you participate in any physical activities or exercises such as running, calisthenics, 
golf, gardening, or walking for exercise?”. We created the risky drinker variable ourselves based on the government 
definition in footnote 2, the calculated alcohol consumption variable mentioned above, and a binge drinking 
question that states, “Considering all types of alcoholic beverages, how many times during the past 30 days did you 
have X [X = 5 for men, X = 4 for women] or more drinks on an occasion?” 
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containing the center city, inside a suburban county of the MSA, or not in an MSA. Moreover, 
the “area type” variable is missing for cell-phone respondents. Following Courtemanche et al. 
(2018a), we define four “local areas” within each state – those living within a central city, 
suburbs, non-MSA, and location unavailable (i.e., cell phone sample) – and calculate the 
pretreatment average uninsured rates accordingly. This approach produces a total of 194 “areas” 
(some states do not have all four area types) with 2013 uninsured rates that are computed from 
between 219 to 5,804 respondents each, with the average being 1,475 respondents and the 
median being 1,205 respondents.6  
Our Medicaid expansion variable is constructed based on information collected by the 
Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF). According to the KFF, 32 states expanded Medicaid by 2016. 
Most states expanded Medicaid in January 2014, with a handful of exceptions. Michigan’s 
expansion (April) and New Hampshire’s expansion (August) both took place during 2014. In 
addition, Pennsylvania, Indiana and Alaska expanded Medicaid in January, February, and 
September of 2015, respectively. Finally, Montana and Louisiana expanded Medicaid in January 
and July of 2016, respectively. We classify states as part of the Medicaid expansion treatment 
group beginning the month of their expansions. 
Table 1 provides pretreatment means and standard deviations for our preventive care and 
risky health behavior dependent variables, stratified into four groups based on whether the 
respondent’s state expanded Medicaid and whether her local area’s pretreatment uninsured rate 
was above or below the median within the sample.7 Table A1 in the Online Appendix does the 
                                                          
6 The lack of county identifiers precludes other possible measures of the “dose” of the ACA’s impact, such as 
county-level variation in physician density, that would have to be computed outside the BRFSS.  
7 We were able to compare the mean baseline BRFSS values of the majority of our health behavior measures of 
interest with publically reported values from the CDC (NCHS, 2017) as a check on their validity. Our measures 
were generally consistent with those compiled by the CDC which gives us confident that our results are not being 
driven by data collection idiosyncrasies associated with the BRFSS. 
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same for our control variables. According to Table 1, 63 percent of respondents had a well 
patient checkup in the past year, 32 percent had a flu shot, 56 percent had a pap test, 36 percent 
had a mammogram, and 44 percent have ever had an HIV test. All preventive care outcomes, 
with the exception of having a HIV test, had higher pretreatment rates in Medicaid expansions 
states, especially in states with below the median baseline uninsured rate. Our econometric 
strategy will account for these baseline differences.  
In terms of risky health behaviors, the average BMI of the sample in the pretreatment 
period was 27.9, 22 percent were smokers, the sample average was almost 15 alcoholic drinks 
per month, and about 21 percent of the sample was engaged in risky drinking. Pretreatment 
smoking and binge drinking rates and the number of drinks per month were higher in states with 
baseline uninsured rates above the median, while BMI was higher among non-expansion states.  
Figure 1 shows how the average values of the preventive care outcome variables change 
across the sample period for four groups stratified by state Medicaid expansion status and local 
area pretreatment uninsured rate (above or below the median). Well-patient doctor visits and flu 
shots were trending upward before the ACA’s 2014 implementation, while Pap tests were 
declining and mammograms and HIV tests were relatively flat. Importantly, for all these 
outcomes the pretreatment trends appear relatively similar across the four groups, providing 
preliminary support for an identification strategy based on pretreatment uninsured rates and 
Medicaid expansion decisions. After the ACA took effect, we see some evidence of increases in 
some of these measures – most notably pap and HIV tests in 2015 – but an econometric 
evaluation is necessary to determine whether these are causal effects of the law.   
Figure 2 presents similar graphs for the risky behavior outcomes. Prior to the ACA’s 
implementation, BMI was trending upward while smoking and drinking were trending 
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downward and exercise did not exhibit a clear pattern. Again, pretreatment trends are broadly 
similar across the four groups. After the ACA, BMI and smoking appear to largely continue their 
pre-existing trends, while the downward trend in drinking disappears and actually turns positive 
for some groups. 
 
Methods 
We seek to estimate the effects of both the fully implemented ACA (including the 
Medicaid expansion) and the ACA without the Medicaid expansion for each outcome. The major 
challenge associated with this objective is in disentangling the impacts of the nationwide 
components of the ACA from underlying annual fluctuations in our outcomes of interest that 
would have occurred even in the absence of the ACA. In this paper we adopt the DDD strategy 
Courtemanche et al. (2017) use to identify the impact of the ACA on health insurance coverage 
after one year and that Courtemanche et al. (2018a) use to estimate the effect on access, risky 
health behaviors, and self-assessed health after two years. Such an approach exploits sub-state 
geographic variation in the intensity of treatment arising from differential pre-reform uninsured 
rates. Adding this layer of sub-state variation allows us to include time period fixed effects while 
still identifying the effects of the national components of the ACA. 
Assuming that a geographic area’s treatment intensity is proportional to its baseline 
(2013) uninsured rate, our DDD model is given by equation (1): 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾2(𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) + 
𝛾𝛾3(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾4𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖               (1) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a generic health behavior outcome described in table 1 for individual i in area type 
a in state s in time period t, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is an indicator for whether period t is in the post-reform 
period of January 2014 or later, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of control variables previously described in 
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table 2, 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator for whether state s participated in the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion as of time (month/year) t, and 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the 2013 (pre-reform) uninsured rate 
in area type (central city, rest of MSA, non-MSA, cell phone) a within state s. Further, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
denotes time fixed effects for each month or year * area type combination; these control for time 
as flexibly as possible and also allow time trends to evolve differentially across individuals living 
in the four different constructed area types. Finally, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes fixed effects for each geographic 
area (e.g., central city in Georgia), and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a standard error term. Note that 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is not 
separately included in equation (1) since it is absorbed by the time fixed effects (𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), while the 
terms 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 are not separately included in equation (1) since they are 
absorbed by the area fixed effects (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖).  
The effect of the ACA on health behaviors without the Medicaid expansion is given by 
𝛾𝛾1 *𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, which means it is assumed to be zero in a (hypothetical) area with a 0 
percent uninsured rate at baseline and increases linearly as the pre-reform uninsured rate rises. 
The identifying assumption is that, in the absence of the ACA, any changes in health behaviors 
that would have occurred in 2014–2016 would not have varied differentially by area uninsured 
rates, conditional on the controls. We do not need to assume that there would have been no 
changes at all in health behaviors in the absence of the ACA (conditional on the controls), as 
would be the case in a pre-post comparison that did not employ variation in pre-reform (2013) 
uninsured rates.  
The effect of the Medicaid expansion alone on health behaviors is given by 𝛾𝛾3 ∗
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖. As with the other pieces of the ACA, this approach assumes that 
the impact of the Medicaid expansion varies linearly with the state’s pre-reform (2013) 
uninsured rate. Following Miller (2012a) and Courtemanche et al. (2017, 2018a), we consider 𝛾𝛾2 
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to represent unobserved confounders rather than capturing part of the expansion’s causal effect, 
since the Medicaid expansion should not causally affect coverage in an area with a 0 percent 
baseline uninsured rate. The identifying assumption for the impact of the Medicaid expansion is 
therefore that, in the absence of the ACA, differential changes in health behaviors in 2014–2016 
between Medicaid expansion and nonexpansion states would not have been correlated with pre-
reform uninsured rates. This is of course a weaker assumption than would be required by a DD 
model examining the impact of the Medicaid expansion on health behaviors. 
We also estimate several variants of equation (1) as robustness checks. First, since some 
control variables (e.g. income, education, marital status) could be endogenous to the ACA, we 
re-estimate our main regression including only the demographic controls age, gender, and 
race/ethnicity. The second and third checks involve two alternate ways to compute pretreatment 
uninsured rates: 1) pooling all three pretreatment years rather than just using 2013, and 2) simply 
using state-level estimates rather than defining sub-state areas based on the “area type” variable. 
For the fourth check, we drop respondents interviewed on cell phones since we do not know 
whether they live in a central city, suburban area, or rural area. Recall that we originally included 
them as a distinct sub-state group. Next, we drop 19-25 year olds since they were already 
partially treated by the ACA dependent coverage expansion that took effect in 2010. In another 
check, we drop the five “early expansion” states that Kaestner et al. (2017) classify as having 
comprehensive Medicaid expansions under the ACA before 2014. Lastly, we drop the seven 
states who took up the Medicaid expansion after January 2014 (Courtemanche et al., 2017). 
 
Results 
  Tables 2 and 3 report the results from the baseline DDD regression for the preventive 
care and risky behavior outcomes, respectively. The results from the robustness checks are 
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generally quite similar; they are available in Tables A2-A11 of the Online Appendix. The top 
panel of each table presents the coefficient estimates and standard errors for the variables of 
interest, while the bottom panel gives the implied effects of the ACA with and without the 
Medicaid expansion at the average pretreatment uninsured rate of 0.206. Indicators of statistical 
significance are given at the 0.1 percent, 1 percent, and 5 percent level. Table A12 of the Online 
Appendix reports all of the regression coefficients from our baseline regressions for each 
outcome. 
The results from Table 2 show that the fully implemented ACA increased utilization of 
all the preventive care outcomes in non-Medicaid-expansion states, with the effects on checkups, 
pap tests, and HIV tests being statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better. The 
magnitudes of the increases are 3.8, 1.9, 4.3, 1.5, and 2.1 percentage points for checkups, flu 
shots, pap tests, mammograms, and HIV tests, respectively. To provide a benchmark, 
Courtemanche et al. (2018b) estimated that the full ACA increased health insurance coverage by 
9.5 percentage points using the same BRFSS data and econometric model. If we assume that the 
ACA only affected preventive care via the extensive margin of health insurance coverage, the 
results therefore imply that between 17 and 50 percent of newly insured individuals increased 
their preventive care usage, depending on the outcome. Moreover, the estimated effects represent 
between 5 and 11 percent of the outcomes’ sample means. For these reasons, we consider the 
magnitude of the increase in preventive care utilization to be economically meaningful. 
Interestingly, all the gains appear to be attributable to the private expansion component of the 
ACA (the package of reforms that took effect nationally), as opposed to the Medicaid expansion. 
The effects of the Medicaid expansion are statistically insignificant and relatively small for all 
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outcomes. Moreover, the increase in mammograms actually becomes significant without the 
Medicaid expansion.   
 Turning to the risky health behavior outcomes in Table 3, we observe only one 
statistically significant effect of the full ACA: a 1.6 percentage point increase in the probability 
of being a risky drinker. This represents a sizeable 7.4 percent increase relative to the sample 
mean. Again, the effect is nearly completely driven by the private portion of the ACA rather than 
the Medicaid expansion. The point estimates for drinks per month, smoking, and exercise also 
point in the direction of worse health behaviors, while the reverse is true for BMI. However, the 
effects for these outcomes are all insignificant and much smaller in magnitude relative to the 
sample mean.    
  
Event Study Model 
We next estimate an event study model to trace out the ACA’s impact by year. This 
serves two purposes. First, such an approach provides indirect tests of the identifying 
assumptions of our DDD model, as any “effects” of the ACA that emerge during the 
pretreatment period likely reflect placebo test failures. Second, the event study model also allows 
us to distinguish between the ACA’s effects in each of the three post-treatment years, thereby 
specifically illustrating the importance of our addition of 2016 to the sample period. The event 
study model is given by the following equation, with 2013 being the base year: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2011𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃2(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2012𝑖𝑖) + 
𝜃𝜃3(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2014𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃4(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2015𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃5(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑌𝑌2016𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃6(𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2011𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃7(𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2012𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃8(𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑌𝑌2014𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃9(𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2015𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃10(𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2016𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃11(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2011𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃12(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2012𝑖𝑖) +
𝜃𝜃13(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2014𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃14(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑌𝑌2015𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃15(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2016𝑖𝑖)  
+𝜽𝜽𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                       (2) 
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where Y2011t, Y2012t, Y2014t, Y2015t, and Y2016t are indicators for each year and the other 
variables are defined as in equation (1). The tests for differential pretreatment trends (i.e., 
falsification tests) are provided by evaluating whether the coefficients on the “treatment” 
variables in the pretreatment years (θ1, θ2, θ11, θ12) are equal to 0.8 
Table 4 presents the event study results for the preventive care outcomes and Table 5 
does the same for the risky health behavior outcomes. Note that the pap test and mammogram 
variables are not available in 2013 and 2015, so 2012 is the base year for those outcomes while 
no effect is reported in 2015. There are a total of 36 falsification tests (four pretreatment 
interaction terms for each of the eight outcomes with no missing years plus two for each of the 
two remaining outcomes). We obtain four falsification test failures, or eleven percent, which is 
reasonably close to the five percent that would expected due to chance, albeit somewhat larger. 
Two of the four failures are for the checkup variable, meaning that for the other outcomes the 
falsification tests only fail six percent of the time. One way to interpret these results is therefore 
that the estimated increase in well-patient checkups should be treated with caution, but that the 
DDD model performs quite well for the other outcomes. 
The coefficient estimates on the treatment variables in the post-reform years provide a 
few new insights. First, new evidence of ex ante moral hazard emerges in the third post-
treatment year: a statistically significant increase in smoking (1.8 percentage points) among 
those in non-expansion states in 2016 and a statistically significant decrease in exercise (2.7 
percentage points) in Medicaid expansion states. These findings were masked in the aggregate 
post-reform results reported in Table 3, and were also not found by either of the prior studies that 
                                                          
8 Recall that the coefficient on the 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  variable in our main regression was assumed to capture 
unobserved confounders rather than part of the causal effect of the Medicaid expansion. We therefore do not 
consider θ6 and θ7 to provide additional falsification tests and do not show the estimates for these coefficients in the 
tables. 
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used only two post-treatment years. Second, we observe some evidence that the gains in 
preventive care diminish over time. The full ACA increased flu shots, pap tests, and 
mammograms by 3.8, 6.2, and 2.5 percentage points, respectively, in the first year after the ACA 
took effect, and all of these effects are statistically significant. In contrast, by 2016 these 
magnitudes had fallen to 2.8, 3.1, and 1.8 percentage points, none of which are statistically 
significant. If taken at face value, these results are consistent with pent-up demand driving some 
of the increase in 2014. However, the estimates from 2014 and 2016 are not statistically 
different, so we are reluctant to emphasize such an interpretation. Moreover, the results for HIV 
tests do not fit this pattern, as the effects (at least in non-expansion states) are stronger in 2016 
and 2015 than in 2014.  
 
Subsample Analyses 
We next conduct subsample analyses that stratify the sample by income and age. We 
expect the ACA’s impacts to be most pronounced among young adults and individuals of low 
socio-economic-status, as these groups experienced the largest insurance coverage gains from the 
ACA (Courtemanche et al., 2018c). Specifically, we re-estimate equation (1) for four 
subsamples: those with household incomes above and below the sample median, and those with 
age above and below the sample median. For each subsample, we re-compute the relevant 
pretreatment uninsured rate based on only the respondents in that particular subsample. The need 
to retain a sufficient number of individuals in each local area in each subsample to compute 
reliable pretreatment uninsured rates is why we only stratify into two broad categories along each 
dimension.  
 Table 6 reports the results for the low income subsample while Table 7 does the same for 
the high income subsample. For the preventive care outcomes, the effects appear largely 
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concentrated among those with incomes below the median. The impacts of the private portion of 
the ACA on checkups, mammograms, and HIV tests are statistically significant for the low 
income subsample, and the magnitudes are larger than those from the full sample reported in 
Table 2. In contrast, we observe statistically insignificant and relatively small effects on these 
outcomes among those above the median income, and the signs are mixed. The only exception to 
this pattern is that the magnitude of the effect of the full ACA on pap tests is almost identical in 
the two subsamples, and is only significant among those with higher incomes since the standard 
error is much smaller for that group. Turning to the risky behavior outcomes, ex ante moral 
hazard appears more prevalent among the high income subsample. As shown in the bottom panel 
of Table 7, for this subsample the estimated effects of the full ACA are in the direction of less 
healthy behaviors for all outcomes. The only result that is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level or better is the estimated increase in smoking, while the rise in risky drinking is significant 
at the 10 percent level. Though statistically insignificant, the estimated increase in drinks per 
month is economically meaningful at 3.3 percent of the sample mean. Among the low income 
subsample, the pattern of signs is more mixed, with the full ACA leading to healthier behaviors 
for three outcomes and less healthy behaviors for two, and none of these estimates are 
statistically significant or especially large.9 
 Tables 8 and 9 report the results for the age subsamples. For preventive care, we see that 
the estimated effects of the full ACA are consistently positive across all outcomes in both 
subsamples. While the impact on checkups is an identical 4.1 percentage points for both groups, 
                                                          
9 The BRFSS only reports income in ranges (e.g. $15,000 to $19,999), so we assign each respondent a value of 
income equal to the midpoint of the associated category when doing the stratification. Since this leads to 
measurement error, we also tried assessing heterogeneity in impacts by socioeconomic status by stratifying by 
education level.  These results are available upon request.  Because the differences across subsamples were less clear 
stratifying by education than income, we decided to report the income subsamples only in the body of this paper. In 
other words, our results suggest that BRFSS income, despite its measurement error, is a better proxy for actual 
income that education. 
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the increases in pap and HIV tests are only statistically significant in the younger subsample, and 
they are much larger than the corresponding increases in the older subsample (4.9 and 3.8 
percentage points compared to 2.0 and 0.1 percentage points). In contrast, the gain in 
mammograms is concentrated among the older subsample, consistent with them being more 
commonly recommended for that age group. For risky behaviors, the patterns are mixed, and the 
only estimates significant at the 5 percent level are an increase in drinks per month from the fully 
implemented ACA for the older subsample and an increase in risky drinking from the private 
portion of the ACA for the younger subsample.     
In an additional set of regressions, we also examined the impacts of the ACA on those 
aged 65 and above as a falsification test. This is because those aged 65 and above should not 
have been directly impacted by the ACA, as they were already covered by Medicare. The results, 
reported in Table 10, were generally both statistically and economically insignificant, as 
expected.   
 
Difference-in-Difference Analysis for Medicaid Expansion 
In the above DDD analyses, we repeatedly find little to no evidence of effects of the 
Medicaid expansion on the various outcomes. While this could indicate genuine null effects, it is 
also possible that the DDD model is poorly suited to identify plausibly sized effects of the 
Medicaid expansion. The DDD estimator for the triple interaction term is inherently less efficient 
than the simpler DD estimator used by most evaluations of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. 
Additionally, as discussed in the previous section, it is impractical to estimate our DDD model 
with narrowly defined subsamples because of the need to retain a sufficient number of 
individuals to compute pretreatment uninsured rates in each local area for each subsample. As 
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such, it may be difficult to identify the effects of a narrowly targeted intervention such as the 
Medicaid expansion, which primarily focused on low-income childless adults.  
For these reasons, we close our empirical analysis by estimating a DD model with the 
sample restricted to adults with household income below 100 percent of the Federal Poverty 
Level (FPL) and no children in the home. The first restriction prevents confounding from the 
ACA’s expansion of private coverage, since those with incomes below 100 percent of the FPL 
were prohibited from purchasing subsidized insurance on the Marketplace. The second 
restriction minimizes the share of the sample that was eligible for Medicaid prior to the ACA, 
since eligibility criteria were more generous for adults with children in most states. By 
estimating a DD model with BRFSS data and a low-income subsample, our approach mirrors 
that of Simon et al. (2017), with the key difference being our inclusion of the third posttreatment 
year. Specifically, the DD model is identical to equation (1) but drops the 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 term. Results from regressions that further drop the 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 term are virtually identical and are available upon request.  
Table 11 reports the results. Even in the less rigorous DD model with a sample narrowly 
restricted to the individuals most likely to benefit from the Medicaid expansion, we find no 
statistically significant effects on any of the ten outcomes in either direction. The magnitudes are 
all relatively small, at least compared to the 9.8 percentage point increase in insurance coverage 
estimated using the same sample and DD method. Additionally, the signs are mixed, with six 
pointing in a favorable direction (greater preventive care use, healthier lifestyle habits) and four 
in an unfavorable direction. Therefore, the null results for the Medicaid expansion observed 
throughout the paper do not appear to simply be due to limitations of the DDD design.   
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Discussion 
 This paper estimates the effects of the ACA on the health behaviors of non-elderly adults 
after three years. We consider two distinct types of outcomes: positive health investments in the 
form of preventive services and disinvestments in the form of risky behaviors. Both types of 
behaviors could theoretically be influenced by both the reduction in effective prices of medical 
services after obtaining insurance coverage and ex ante moral hazard from the expectation of 
lower out-of-pocket costs in the future if a preventable illness occurs. Using data from the 
BRFSS and an identification strategy that leverages variation in pre-ACA uninsured rates and 
state Medicaid expansion decisions, we find some evidence to support both of these hypotheses. 
The ACA increased preventive care along several dimensions, including well-patient checkups, 
pap tests, mammograms, and HIV tests. This is consistent with the direct price effect dominating 
ex ante moral hazard for preventive services, which makes sense since these services are 
purchased directly in the medical sector. In contrast, while certain medical treatments can help 
individuals make healthier lifestyle choices, the prices of food, gym memberships, alcohol, and 
cigarettes are not directly influenced by health insurance. Perhaps for this reason, we find that ex 
ante moral hazard dominates for at least some risky behaviors, while other behaviors do not 
seem to be influenced by insurance in either direction.   
 An interesting aspect of our results is that we consistently find that any observed effects 
are attributable to the “private portion” of the ACA – the package of national reforms including 
regulations in the non-group insurance market, mandates, and subsidized health insurance 
exchanges – as opposed to the Medicaid expansion. This echoes the findings of Courtemanche et 
al. (2018a, 2018b) that improvements in access to care and self-assessed health from the ACA 
are driven mostly by the private expansion. One possible explanation is that Medicaid 
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historically pays providers much less than private insurers, which can lead to difficulty finding a 
primary care doctor or specialist.10 Since the medical services under consideration in this paper – 
screenings, vaccines, counseling services, and prescriptions for weight loss or smoking cessation 
drugs – are generally administered in office-based settings, this could potentially help explain 
Medicaid’s null effects.  
However, other factors argue against this explanation. Medicaid increased its payment 
rates to match those of Medicare in 2013 and 2014, with only a few states maintaining the full 
fee bump thereafter.11 Polsky et al. (2015) show that the Medicaid fee bump improved 
availability of primary care appointments for enrollees. This implies that, if provider payment 
rates are the issue, we should have found a positive of effect of Medicaid expansion on 
preventive care in 2014 followed by a reduction in 2015, rather than null effects across all years. 
Moreover, results from the randomized Oregon Medicaid experiment indicate that Medicaid 
increased use of preventive services, even without the fee bump (Finkelstein et al., 2012; Baicker 
et al., 2013). In sum, it is difficult to say more at this stage beyond simply that Medicaid’s effects 
may vary by context, which could include both demand-side factors such as the demographic 
characteristics of newly covered individuals or supply-side factors such as supply of health care 
providers. Additionally, a Medicaid expansion could conceivably be less effective when it occurs 
alongside an expansion of private coverage (i.e. Marketplace coverage), as the expansion of 
private coverage places additional strain on provider capacity.  
 Another noteworthy result is that, while the majority of our results for risky behaviors are 
statistically insignificant, we find relatively robust evidence that the ACA increased risky 
drinking. It is possible that a single result could emerge by chance given the large number of 
                                                          
10 See, for instance, https://health.usnews.com/health-news/health-insurance/articles/2015/05/26/youve-got-
medicaid-why-cant-you-see-the-doctor.  
11 See https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2015/04/23/states-to-continue-medicaid-pay-bump.  
23 
 
hypotheses tested in our paper,12 but it is also possible that ex ante moral hazard could be 
especially pronounced in the case of risky drinking. One argument for why ex ante moral hazard 
has not been found more frequently in the literature is that diseases from many risky behaviors, 
such as cancer or heart disease from smoking or obesity, often occur far into the future. 
Individuals may assume that even if they are currently uninsured, they will be insured (perhaps 
by Medicare or a future job) by time those illnesses occur (Barbaresco et al., 2015). In contrast, 
excessive drinking can lead to the need for expensive medical care immediately, such as an 
ambulance ride and hospitalization due to acute alcohol poisoning.  
 Our work is subject to several limitations, including general concerns about the extent to 
which the self-reported outcomes we examine accurately measure the behavior of BRFSS 
respondents. That being said, subjective self-reported health variables have been shown to be 
correlated with objective measures of health, such as mortality (Idler and Benyamini 1997; 
DeSalvo et al. 2006; Phillips, Der, and Carroll 2010). In our particular context, one may be 
additionally concerned that gains in coverage led to gains in knowledge about health status and 
behaviors through increased interaction with health care providers and that this led to changes in 
reporting rather than actual changes in behavior. 
 In closing, while our research offers important new information about the effects of the 
ACA over a longer time frame than most prior studies, our results nonetheless provide only one 
piece of a much larger puzzle. Any comprehensive evaluation of the ACA would have to take 
into account effects on a wide range of other outcomes, including overall health, financial 
                                                          
12 Following arguments made in other studies that looked at a similar number of outcomes, such as Barbaresco et al. 
(2015), we do not implement formal methods for multiple hypothesis testing because, while these control the Type I 
error rate, they do so at the expense of a large increase in the Type II error rate. While we cannot rule out the 
possibility of an occasional spurious result given the number of hypotheses tested, it is worth noting that we obtain 
many more statistically significant results than would be expected due to chance. For instance, in Tables 2 and 3, 
which contain our baseline results, we report twenty coefficient estimates. Five are significant at the 5 percent level, 
whereas only one would be expected to be significant by chance.  
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protection, health care expenditures, fiscal costs, employment, and wages. We contribute to this 
broader debate by providing new evidence that the ACA increased utilization of preventive 
services but led to less healthy lifestyles along at least some dimensions.    
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Figure 1 – Changes in Preventive Care Variables over Time by State Medicaid Expansion 
Status and Local Area Pretreatment Uninsured Rate 
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Figure 2 – Changes in Risky Health Behavior Variables over Time by State Medicaid 
Expansion Status and Local Area Pretreatment Uninsured Rate 
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Table 1 – Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by State Medicaid 
Expansion Status and Pretreatment Uninsured Rate 
 Full 
Sample 
Medicaid 
Expansion;  
≥ Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Medicaid 
Expansion; 
< Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured  
Non-
Expansion; 
≥ Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Non-
Expansion; 
< Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured  
Checkup 0.626 
(0.483) 
0.600 
(0.490) 
0.689 
(0.462) 
0.593 
(0.491) 
0.679 
(0.467) 
Flu Shot 0.324 
(0.467) 
0.324 
(0.469) 
0.402 
(0.490) 
0.292 
(0.455) 
0.358 
(0.479) 
Pap Test 0.559 
(0.496) 
0.522 
(0.500) 
0.562 
(0.496) 
0.556 
(0.497) 
0.564 
(0.496) 
Mammogram  0.363 
(0.481) 
0.332 
(0.471) 
0.484 
(0.500) 
0.285 
(0.451) 
0.447 
(0.497) 
HIV 0.443 
(0.497) 
0.439 
(0.496) 
0.395 
(0.489) 
0.490 
(0.500) 
0.419 
(0.493) 
BMI 
 
27.864 
(6.282) 
27.944 
(6.386) 
27.906 
(6.225) 
28.059 
(6.446) 
28.252 
(6.379) 
Smoker 
 
0.216 
(0.412) 
0.246 
(0.430) 
0.185 
(0.388) 
0.241 
(0.428) 
0.202 
(0.401) 
Alcoholic Drinks per Month 
 
14.292 
(36.019) 
13.833 
(35.114) 
13.526 
(31.460) 
14.783 
(39.790) 
12.692 
(31.912) 
Risky Drinking 0.217 
(0.412) 
0.212 
(0.409) 
0.190 
(0.392) 
0.217 
(0.413) 
0.179 
(0.383) 
Any Exercise 0.768 
(0.422) 
0.760 
(0.427) 
0.787 
(0.410) 
0.739 
(0.439) 
0.762 
(0.426) 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. BRFSS sampling weights are used. 
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Table 2 – Effects of ACA on Preventive Care Outcomes 
(Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.206) 
 Checkup Flu Shot Pap Test Mammogram HIV Test 
Coefficient Estimates of Interest      
Post * Pretreatment Uninsured 0.136*** 
(0.039) 
0.083 
(0.079) 
0.288* 
(0.118) 
0.095** 
(0.030) 
0.113*** 
(0.034) 
Medicaid Expansion * Post * Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
0.051 
(0.053) 
0.008 
(0.068) 
-0.080 
(0.106) 
-0.022 
(0.056) 
-0.011 
(0.035) 
Implied Effects of ACA at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate     
ACA without Medicaid Expansion 0.028*** 
(0.008) 
0.017 
(0.016) 
0.059* 
(0.024) 
0.020** 
(0.006) 
0.023** 
(0.007) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.011 
(0.108) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
-0.017 
(0.022) 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid Expansion) 0.038*** 
(0.011) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
0.043* 
(0.019) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
0.021* 
(0.008) 
      
Pretreatment Mean and Standard Deviation of 
Outcome 
0.639 
(0.483) 
0.335 
(0.472) 
0.515 
(0.499) 
0.350 
(0.477) 
0.447 
(0.497) 
Sample Size 1,577,507 1,497,214 441.224 443,970 1,446,305 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% 
level. BRFSS sampling weights are used. All regressions include state*location type and year*location type fixed effects as well as the controls. 
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Table 3 – Effects of ACA on Risky Health Behaviors 
(Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.206) 
 BMI Drinks per 
Month 
Risky 
Drinking 
Smoker Any Exercise 
Coefficient Estimates of Interest      
Post * Pretreatment Uninsured -0.236 
(0.393) 
1.766 
(2.378) 
0.076 
(0.028) 
-0.007 
(0.042) 
-0.003 
(0.050) 
Medicaid Expansion * Post * Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
0.011 
(0.494) 
1.463 
(2.153) 
0.006 
(0.003) 
0.033 
(0.032) 
0.038 
(0.051) 
Implied Effects of ACA at Mean Pretreatment 
Uninsured Rate 
     
ACA without Medicaid Expansion -0.049 
(0.081) 
0.363 
(0.489) 
0.016* 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.002 
(0.101) 
0.301 
(0.442) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid Expansion) -0.046 
(0.086) 
0.664 
(0.496) 
0.017* 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
      
Pretreatment Mean and Standard Deviation of 
Outcome 
27.977 
(6.384) 
14.203 
(36.379) 
0.215 
(0.410) 
0.205 
(0.404) 
0.772 
(0.419) 
Sample Size 1,503,710 1,510,877 1,502,567 1,547,824 1,532,577 
See notes from Table 2. 
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Table 4 – Event Study Regressions for Preventive Care Outcomes 
 Checkup Flu Shot Pap Test Mammo-
gram 
HIV Test 
Coefficient Estimates of Interest 
2011 * Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
-0.297** 
(0.089) 
0.128 
(0.066) 
-0.063 
(0.076) 
0.103 
(0.059) 
-0.055 
(0.050) 
2012 * Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
-0.178** 
(0.065) 
0.055 
(0.046) 
-- -- 0.050 
(0.039) 
2014 * Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
-0.029 
(0.050) 
0..029 
(0.094) 
0.192* 
(0.087) 
0.067 
(0.040) 
0.056 
(0.077) 
2015 * Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
-0.041 
(0.092) 
0.209 
(0.163) 
-- -- 0.176* 
(0.069) 
2016 * Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
0.092 
(0.083) 
0.177 
(0.089) 
0.237 
(0.181) 
0.055 
(0.053) 
0.154 
(0.075) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2011 
* Pretreatment Uninsured 
0.105 
(0.080) 
-0.039 
(0.052) 
0.011 
(0.117) 
0.037 
(0.077) 
-0.110 
(0.056) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2012 
* Pretreatment Uninsured 
0.036 
(0.052) 
0.076 
(0.063) 
-- -- -0.159* 
(0.058) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2014 
* Pretreatment Uninsured 
0.061 
(0.58) 
0.156 
(0.63) 
0.111 
(0.116) 
0.053 
(0.068) 
-0.084 
(0.077) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2015 
* Pretreatment Uninsured 
0.091 
(0.080) 
-0.037 
(0126) 
-- -- -0.117 
(0.084) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2016 
* Pretreatment Uninsured 
0.033 
(0.086) 
-0.042 
(0.090) 
-0.084 
(0.154) 
0.029 
(0.063) 
-0.156** 
(0.053) 
Implied Effects of ACA at Mean Pretreatment Uninsured Rate 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion in 2014 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.019) 
0.040* 
(0.018) 
0.014 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.016) 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion in 2015 
0.008 
(0.019) 
0.043 
(0.034) 
-- -- 0.036* 
(0.014) 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion in 2016 
0.019 
(0.017) 
0.036 
(0.018) 
0.049 
(0.037) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.032* 
(0.015) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) in 2014 
0.007 
(0.011) 
0.038* 
(0.016) 
0.062*** 
(0.017) 
0.025* 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) in 2015 
0.010 
(0.012) 
0.036 
(0.022) 
N/A N/A 0.012 
(0.012) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) in 2016 
0.026 
(0.016) 
0.028 
(0.023) 
0.031 
(0.025) 
0.018 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
See notes from Table 2. 
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Table 5 – Event Study Regressions for Risky Health Behaviors 
 BMI Drinks per 
Month 
Risky 
Drinking 
Smoker Any 
Exercise 
Coefficient Estimates of Interest 
2011 * Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
0.933 
(0.704) 
-6.064 
(3.222) 
-0.045 
(0.042) 
0.074 
(0.037) 
0.091 
(0.053) 
2012 * Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
-0.869 
(0.651) 
-0.220 
(4.892) 
-0.121** 
(0.038) 
0.044 
(0.047) 
-0.034 
(0.101) 
2014 * Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
-0.703 
(0.714) 
7.779 
(3.921) 
0.017 
(0.034) 
0.013 
(0.052) 
0.001 
(0.051) 
2015 * Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
-0.556 
(0.637) 
-3.183 
(2.885) 
0.060 
(0.050) 
0.064 
(0.034) 
0.064 
(0.045) 
2016 * Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
-0.358 
(0.569) 
-6.438 
(3.748) 
-0.031 
(0.037) 
0.087* 
(0.039) 
-0.032 
(0.107) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2011 
* Pretreatment Uninsured 
-0.049 
(0.814) 
2.131 
(5.242) 
-0.005 
(0.057) 
-0.083 
(0.042) 
-0.084 
(0.065) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2012 
* Pretreatment Uninsured 
1.880* 
(0.793) 
-6.846 
(6.174) 
0.015 
(0.046) 
-0.097 
(0.054) 
-0.093 
(0.109) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2014 
* Pretreatment Uninsured 
0.856 
(0.887) 
-7.236 
(4.284) 
0.016 
(0.039) 
0.019 
(0.049) 
0.012 
(0.049) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2015 
* Pretreatment Uninsured 
1.252 
(0.730) 
3.307 
(4.064) 
-0.040 
(0.050) 
-0.052 
(0.037) 
-0.003 
(0.057) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2016 
* Pretreatment Uninsured 
1.234 
(0.906) 
5.796 
(3.968) 
0.056 
(0.052 
-0.071 
(0.044) 
-0.098 
(0.082) 
Implied Effects of ACA at Mean Pretreatment Uninsured Rate 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion in 2014 
-0.145 
(0.015) 
1.600 
(0.806) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion in 2015 
-0.114 
(0.131) 
-0.655 
(0.594) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion in 2016 
-0.074 
(0.117) 
-1.324 
(0.771) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
0.018* 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.022) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) in 2014 
0.032 
(0.123) 
-0.112 
(0.809) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) in 2015 
0.143 
(0.173) 
0.026 
(1.026) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) in 2016 
0.180 
(0.137) 
-0.132 
(0.661) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.027* 
(0.011) 
See notes from Table 2. 
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Table 6 – Income Below Median Subsample 
(Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.320) 
Preventive Care Outcomes: Checkup Flu Shot Pap Test Mammogram HIV Test 
ACA w/o Medicaid    0.045** 
(0.017) 
0.021 
(0.019) 
0.073 
(0.050) 
0.043*** 
(0.011) 
0.038*** 
(0.011) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.001 
(0.018) 
9.006 
(0.020) 
-0.036 
(0.039) 
-0.001 
(0.018) 
-0.022 
(0.015) 
Full ACA (w/ Medicaid) 0.045** 
(0.016) 
0.027 
(0.017) 
0.037 
(0.035) 
0.042* 
(0.017) 
0.016 
(0.015) 
      
Pretreatment Mean and 
Standard Deviation 
0.581 
(0.493) 
0.282 
(0.450) 
0.523 
(0.499) 
0.290 
(0.454) 
0.475 
(0.499) 
Sample Size 796,268 748,471 230,937 232,567 722,738 
      
Risky Health Behavior 
Outcomes: 
BMI Drinks per 
Month 
Risky 
Drinking 
Smoker Any 
Exercise 
ACA w/o Medicaid  -0.080 
(0.118) 
0.894 
(0.795) 
0.021 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.006 
(0.175) 
-0.900 
(0.682) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.020 
(0.017) 
Full ACA (w/ Medicaid) -0.074 
(0.138) 
-0.007 
(0.760) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
      
Pretreatment Mean and 
Standard Deviation 
28.344 
(6.766) 
12.507 
(37.676) 
0.196 
(0.397) 
0.276 
(0.447) 
0.709 
(0.454) 
Sample Size 752,253 756,077 750,961 779,208 769,377 
See notes from Table 2. 
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Table 7 – Income Above Median Subsample 
(Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.064) 
Preventive Care 
Outcomes: 
Checkup Flu Shot Pap Test Mammogram HIV Test 
ACA w/o Medicaid    0.007 
(0.007) 
0.015 
(0.012) 
0.020* 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.010 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
0.019 
(0.012) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
Full ACA (w/ Medicaid) 0.016 
(0.010) 
0.017 
(0.009) 
0.038** 
(0.013) 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
      
Pretreatment Mean and 
Standard Deviation 
0.684 
(0.465) 
0.378 
(0.484) 
0.610 
(0.487) 
0.464 
(0.499) 
0.41 
(0.491) 
Sample Size 781,239 748,743 210,287 211,403 723,567 
      
Risky Health Behavior 
Outcomes: 
BMI Drinks per 
Month 
Risky 
Drinking 
Smoker Any 
Exercise 
ACA w/o Medicaid  -0.026 
(0.070) 
-0.275 
(0.447) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.066 
(0.096) 
0.822 
(0.412) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.010* 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
Full ACA (w/ Medicaid) 0.040 
(0.099) 
0.547 
(0.470) 
0.016 
(0.008) 
0.017** 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
      
Pretreatment Mean and 
Standard Deviation 
27.289 
(5.580) 
16,474 
(33.297) 
0.244 
(0.423) 
0.141 
(0.348) 
0.842 
(0.365 ) 
Sample Size 751,457 754,800 751,606 768,616 763,200 
See notes from Table 2. 
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Table 8 – Age Below Median (19-48) Subsample 
(Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.236) 
Preventive Care 
Outcomes: 
Checkup Flu Shot Pap Test Mammogram HIV Test 
ACA w/o Medicaid    0.020* 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.018) 
0.064** 
(0.023) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.021** 
(0.006) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.021 
(0.012) 
0.011 
(0.020) 
-0.015 
(0.029) 
0.004 
(0.016) 
0.018 
(0.009) 
Full ACA (w/ Medicaid) 0.041*** 
(0.011) 
0.017 
(0.014) 
0.049* 
(0.024) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
0.038*** 
(0.009) 
      
Pretreatment Mean and 
Standard Deviation 
0.577 
(0.494) 
0.281 
(0.449) 
0.596 
(0.491) 
0.221 
(0.415) 
0.515 
(0.500) 
Sample Size 779,427 732,916 212,543 213,531 710,785 
      
Risky Health Behavior 
Outcomes: 
BMI Drinks per 
Month 
Risky 
Drinking 
Smoker Any 
Exercise 
ACA w/o Medicaid  -0.070 
(0.108) 
0.599 
(0.734) 
0.017* 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.013 
(0.152) 
-0.218 
(0.696) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.014) 
Full ACA (w/ Medicaid) -0.083 
(0.127) 
0.381 
(0.747) 
0.018 
(0.009) 
0.015 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
      
Pretreatment Mean and 
Standard Deviation 
27.489 
(6.273) 
15.194 
(37.965) 
0.256 
(0.436) 
0.225 
(0.417) 
0.787 
(0.409) 
Sample Size 736,688 742,330 737,948 763,051 753,292 
See notes from Table 2. 
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Table 9 – Age Above Median (49-64) Subsample 
(Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.155) 
Preventive Care 
Outcomes: 
Checkup Flu Shot Pap Test Mammogram HIV Test 
ACA w/o Medicaid    0.042*** 
(0.012) 
0.037* 
(0.015) 
0.045 
(0.026) 
0.038* 
(0.015) 
0.026* 
(0.010) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.001 
(0.016) 
-0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.025 
(0.026) 
-0.001 
(0.017) 
-0.026* 
(0.011) 
Full ACA (w/ Medicaid) 0.041*** 
(0.010) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
0.020 
(0.023) 
0.037** 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
      
Pretreatment Mean and 
Standard Deviation 
0.717 
(0.451) 
0.406 
(0.491) 
0.497 
(0.500) 
0.612 
(0.487) 
0.315 
(0.464) 
Sample Size 798,080 764,298 228,681 230,439 735,520 
      
Risky Health Behavior 
Outcomes: 
BMI Drinks per 
Month 
Risky 
Drinking 
Smoker Any 
Exercise 
ACA w/o Medicaid  -0.118 
(0.109) 
0.267 
(0.582) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.166 
(0.151) 
1.144 
(0.711) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
Full ACA (w/ Medicaid) 0.048 
(0.117) 
1.412* 
(0.586) 
0.014 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
      
Pretreatment Mean and 
Standard Deviation 
28.635 
(6.235) 
12.640 
(31.553) 
0.149 
(0.356) 
0.201 
(0.400) 
0.733 
(442) 
Sample Size 767,022 768,547 764,619 784,773 779,285 
See notes from Table 2. 
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Table 10 – Age 65 and Older 
Preventive Care 
Outcomes: 
Checkup Flu Shot Pap Test Mammogram HIV Test 
ACA w/o Medicaid    0.003 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.004 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.020** 
(0.007) 
Full ACA (w/ Medicaid) 0.007* 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.012* 
(0.006) 
      
Pretreatment Mean and 
Standard Deviation 
0.858 
(0.349) 
0.605 
(0.489) 
0.270 
(0.444) 
0.626 
(0.484) 
0.123 
(0.329) 
Sample Size 731,224 700,828 219,203 255,172 655,332 
      
Risky Health Behavior 
Outcomes: 
BMI Drinks per 
Month 
Risky 
Drinking 
Smoker Any 
Exercise 
ACA w/o Medicaid  0.096 
(0.083) 
-0.345 
(0.322) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.038 
(0.074) 
-0.103 
(0.281) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
Full ACA (w/ Medicaid) 0.058 
(0.031) 
-0.448 
(0.395) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
      
Pretreatment Mean and 
Standard Deviation 
27.546 
(5.394) 
9.647 
(27.100) 
0.069 
(0.253) 
0.091 
(0.288) 
0.685 
(0.465) 
Sample Size 711,120 704,029 701,088 718,118 714,310 
See notes from Table 2. Also, since the pretreatment uninsured rate for those 65 and older is very small because of 
Medicare, we evaluate the effects at the nonelderly pretreatment uninsured rate of 0.206.  
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Table 11 – Difference-in-Difference Results for Childless Adults Below Poverty Line 
Preventive Care 
Outcomes: 
Checkup Flu Shot Pap Test Mammogram HIV Test 
Medicaid Expansion 0.035 
(0.026) 
-0.006 
(0.018) 
-0.012 
(0.030) 
0.013 
(0.018) 
-0.011 
(0.016) 
Pre-Treatment Mean and 
Standard Deviation 
0.625 
(0.484) 
0.323 
(0.467) 
0.347 
(0.479) 
0.357 
(0.479) 
0.387 
(0.487) 
Sample Size 110,021 103,093 32,765 33,432 98,196 
      
Risky Health Behavior 
Outcomes: 
BMI Drinks per 
Month 
Risky 
Drinking 
Smoker Any 
Exercise 
Medicaid Expansion 0.213 
(0.182) 
-1.980 
(1.754) 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
0.024 
(0.019) 
Pre-Treatment Mean and 
Standard Deviation 
28.163 
(7.303) 
11.445 
(41.510) 
0.160 
(0.367) 
0.304 
(0.460) 
0.641 
(0.480) 
Sample Size 104,908 103,886 103,097 107,512 106,199 
See notes for Table 2. 
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Appendix Table A1 – Summary Statistics for Control Variables by State Medicaid 
Expansion Status and Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate 
 Full Sample Medicaid 
Expansion;  
≥ Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Medicaid 
Expansion; 
< Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured  
Non- 
Expansion; 
≥ Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Non- 
Expansion; 
< Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured  
Age 25-29 0.105 
(0.306) 
0.164 
(0.370) 
0.072 
(0.258) 
0.140 
(0.347) 
0.060 
(0.237) 
Age 30-34 0.118 
(0.323) 
0.152 
(0.359) 
0.099 
(0.298) 
0.137 
(0.344) 
0.094 
(0.292) 
Age 35-39 0.107 
(0.302) 
0.110 
(0.313) 
0.098 
(0.297) 
0.105 
(0.307) 
0.096 
(0.294) 
Age 40-44 0.119 
(0.323) 
0.103 
(0.304) 
0.125 
(0.331) 
0.113 
(0.316) 
0.134 
(0.340) 
Age 45-49 0.108 
(0.309) 
0.084 
(0.277) 
0.121 
(0.326) 
0.093 
(0.289) 
0.127 
(0.333) 
Age 50-54 0.130 
(0.336) 
0.093 
(0.289) 
0.151 
(0.358) 
0.106 
(0.308) 
0.161 
(0.367) 
Age 55-59 0.104 
(0.304) 
0.066 
(0.249) 
0.127 
(0.332) 
0.077 
(0.267) 
0.130 
(0.337) 
Age 60-64 0.096 
(0.294) 
0.054 
(0.227) 
0.119 
(0.324) 
0.070 
(0.255) 
0.131 
(0.337) 
Female 0.497 
(0.499) 
0.450 
(0.497) 
0.522 
(0.499) 
0.470 
(0.499) 
0.537 
(0.499) 
Black 0.122 
(0.327) 
0.107 
(0.309) 
0.096 
(0.194) 
0.176 
(0.381) 
0.142 
(0.349) 
Hispanic 0.166 
(0.372) 
0.215 
(0.411) 
0.141 
(0.347) 
0.220 
(0.414) 
0.089 
(0.285) 
White 0.633 
(0.482) 
0.578 
(0.493) 
0.674 
(0.469) 
0.548 
(0.497) 
0.718 
(0.450) 
Married 
 
0.524 
(0.499) 
0.398 
(0.489) 
0.584 
(0.492) 
0.461 
(0.497) 
0.639 
(0.482) 
High school degree 
 
0.267 
(0.443) 
0.261 
(0.439) 
0.264 
(0.440) 
0.281 
(0.449) 
0.269 
(0.443) 
Some College 0.320 
(0.466) 
0.338 
(0.473) 
0.305 
(0.461) 
0.322 
(0.467) 
0.328 
(0.470) 
College graduate 
 
0.281 
(0.449) 
0.238 
(0.426) 
0.321 
(0.467) 
0.231 
(0.421) 
0.306 
(0.461) 
-- CONTINUED -- 
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Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 Full 
Sample 
Medicaid 
Expansion;  
≥ Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Medicaid 
Expansion; 
< Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured  
Non- 
Expansion; 
≥ Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Non- 
Expansion; 
< Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured  
One child 0.181 
(0.385) 
0.182 
(0.387) 
0.181 
(0.385) 
0.184 
(0.387) 
0.179 
(0.383) 
Two children 0.166 
(0.372) 
0.152 
(0.359) 
0.175 
(0.380) 
0.164 
(0.370) 
0.166 
(0.372) 
Three children 0.072 
(0.257) 
0.069 
(0.253) 
0.072 
(0.259) 
0.074 
(0.262) 
0.071 
(0.258) 
Four children 
 
0.025 
(0.156) 
0.026 
(0.158) 
0.011 
(0.105) 
0.029 
(0.168) 
0.024 
(0.154) 
Unemployed 0.091 
(0.280) 
0.105 
(0.307) 
0.086 
(0.280) 
0.093 
(0.291) 
0.012 
(0.107) 
Unemployment rate 8.053 
(1.628) 
8.508 
(1.278) 
8.307 
(1.721) 
7.388 
(1.468) 
7.585 
(1.635) 
Student  0.051 
(0.221) 
0.075 
(0.264) 
0.043 
(0.202) 
0.058 
(0.233) 
0.032 
(0.176) 
Income 10k to less than 15k 0.058 
(0.235) 
0.077 
(0.266) 
0.046 
(0.209) 
0.073 
(0.260) 
0.046 
(0.208) 
Income 15k to less than 20k 0.080 
(0.271) 
0.099 
(0.298) 
0.062 
(0.240) 
0.108 
(0.311) 
0.068 
(0.251) 
Income 20k to less than 25k 0.089 
(0.286) 
0.103 
(0.304) 
0.073 
(0.259) 
0.115 
(0.319) 
0.083 
(0.276) 
Income 25k to less than 35k 0.103 
(0.304) 
0.113 
(0.317) 
0.090 
(0.286) 
0.123 
(0.329) 
0.095 
(0.293) 
Income 35k to less than 50k 0.134 
(0.340) 
0.133 
(0.340) 
0.128 
(0.334) 
0.142 
(0.349) 
0.140 
(0.347) 
Income 50k to less than 75k 0.154 
(0.360) 
0.141 
(0.347) 
0.164 
(0.370) 
0.133 
(0.340) 
0.171 
(0.376) 
Income more than 75k 0.309 
(0.460) 
0.230 
(0.421) 
0.382 
(0.486) 
0.217 
(0.411) 
0.351 
(0.478) 
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Appendix Table A2 – Implied Effect of ACA on Probability of Having a Well Doctor Visit at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured 
Rate: Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
Drop 19-25 
Year Olds 
Drop States 
with Full 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014-2016 
Expanders 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.026** 
(0.009) 
0.030*** 
(0.008) 
0.030** 
(0.009) 
0.034** 
(0.011) 
0.029*** 
(0.007) 
0.026** 
(0.009) 
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.011 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
0.019 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.018) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.012) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) 
0.037*** 
(0.009) 
0.043*** 
(0.011) 
0.049*** 
(0.012) 
0.027 
(0.015) 
0.038*** 
(0.011) 
0.034** 
(0.012) 
0.046*** 
(0.012) 
Sample Size 1,592,995 1,577,507 1,577,507 955,099 1,483,247 1,431,550 1,381,042 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% 
level. BRFSS sampling weights are used. All regressions include state*location type and year*location type fixed effects as well as the controls. 
 
Appendix Table A3 – Implied Effect of ACA on Probability of Having a Flu Shot at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate: 
Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
Drop 19-25 
Year Olds 
Drop States 
with Full 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014-2016 
Expanders 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.015 
(0.016) 
0.023 
(0.017) 
0.036* 
(0.016) 
0.029*** 
(0.008) 
0.019 
(0.014) 
0.017 
(0.017) 
0.022 
(0.019) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.004 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
-0.024 
(0.021) 
-0.051 
(0.019) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) 
0.020 
(0.012) 
0.026 
(0.014) 
0.012 
(0.017) 
-0.023 
(0.021) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
0.032* 
(0.014) 
Sample Size 1,504,439 1,497,214 1,497,214 914,444 1,409,996 1,359,777 1,311,153 
See notes from Appendix Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A4 – Implied Effect of ACA on Probability of Having a Pap Test at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate: 
Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
Drop 19-25 
Year Olds 
Drop States 
with Full 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014-2016 
Expanders 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.055* 
(0.025) 
0.056* 
(0.024) 
0.070*** 
(0.020) 
0.019 
(0.023) 
0.055 
(0.029) 
0.060* 
(0.025) 
0.066* 
(0.025) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.016 
(0.022) 
-0.017 
(0.025) 
-0.023 
(0.026) 
0.011 
(0.031) 
-0.018 
(0.026) 
-0.029 
(0.021) 
-0.021 
(0.019) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) 
0.039* 
(0.017) 
0.039 
(0.023) 
0.047* 
(0.021) 
0.030 
(0.022) 
0.036 
(0.019) 
0.031 
(0.020) 
0.045 
(0.023) 
Sample Size 442,967 441,224 441,224 270,841 418,028 400,913 387,583 
See notes from Appendix Table A2. 
Appendix Table A5 – Implied Effect of ACA on Probability of Having a Mammogram at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured 
Rate: Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
Drop 19-25 
Year Olds 
Drop States 
with Full 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014-2016 
Expanders 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.017* 
(0.007) 
0.019* 
(0.007) 
0.024*** 
(0.006) 
0.028** 
(0.009) 
0.025*** 
(0.007) 
0.018** 
(0.006) 
0.018* 
(0.007) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.016) 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
0.026 
(0.014) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
0.019 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.012) 
Sample Size 445,744 443,970 443,970 272,488 420,648 403,349 389,924 
See notes from Appendix Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A6 – Implied Effect of ACA on Probability of Having a HIV Test at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate: 
Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
Drop 19-25 
Year Olds 
Drop States 
with Full 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014-2016 
Expanders 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.020** 
(0.008) 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
0.023* 
(0.010) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
0.023** 
(0.009) 
0.023** 
(0.007) 
0.028*** 
(0.007) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
0.038** 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) 
0.017 
(0.010) 
0.023** 
(0.008) 
0.021* 
(0.008) 
0.028** 
(0.010) 
0.019* 
(0.009) 
0.022* 
(0.009) 
0.028** 
(0.009) 
Sample Size 1,453,114 1,446,305 1,446,305 883,864 1,361,038 1,313,615 1,266,655 
See notes from Appendix Table A2. 
Appendix Table A7 – Implied Effect of ACA on Probability of Smoking at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate: Robustness 
Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
Drop 19-25 
Year Olds 
Drop States 
with Full 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014-2016 
Expanders 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.017* 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.005 
(0.009) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
0.023* 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.016* 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
Sample Size 1,555,778 1,547,824 1,547,824 941,023 1,455,902 1,405,248 1,355,368 
See notes from Appendix Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A8 – Implied Effect of ACA on the Number of Drinks per Month at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate: 
Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
Drop 19-25 
Year Olds 
Drop States 
with Full 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014-2016 
Expanders 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.427 
(0.054) 
0.130 
(0.560) 
-0.028 
(0.619) 
-0.220 
(0.756) 
0.237 
(0.592) 
0.374 
(0.504) 
0.340 
(0.577) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.448 
(0.536) 
0.232 
(0.496) 
0.752 
(0.672) 
1.723 
(1.110) 
0.349 
(0.595) 
0.671 
(0.430) 
0.538 
(0.501) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) 
0.876 
(0.459) 
0.362 
(0.595) 
0.724 
(0.545) 
1.504 
(0.836) 
0.586 
(0.471) 
1.045* 
(0.491) 
0.878 
(0.637) 
Sample Size 1,518,096 1,510,877 1,510,877 918,902 1,4221,48 1,371,966 1,323,365 
See notes from Appendix Table A2. 
Appendix Table A9 – Implied Effect of ACA on BMI at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate: Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
Drop 19-25 
Year Olds 
Drop States 
with Full 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014-2016 
Expanders 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
-0.009 
(0.082) 
-0.089 
(0.085) 
-0.073 
(0.080) 
0.086 
(0.079) 
-0.120 
(0.099) 
-0.074 
(0.079) 
-0.080 
(0.098) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.036 
(0.110) 
-0.015 
(0.107) 
0.196 
(0.126) 
-0.089 
(0.139) 
0.030 
(0.127) 
0.008 
(0.103) 
0.016 
(0.109) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) 
-0.044 
(0.102) 
-0.104 
(0.087) 
0.123 
(0.093) 
-0.003 
(0.125) 
-0.089 
(0.094) 
-0.066 
(0.093) 
-0.065 
(0.102) 
Sample Size 1,510,854 1,503,710 1,503,710 911,795 1,414,679 1,365,135 1,316,701 
See notes from Appendix Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A10 – Implied Effect of ACA on Probability of Having Exercised in the Last 30 Days at Mean Pre-Treatment 
Uninsured Rate: Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
Drop 19-25 
Year Olds 
Drop States 
with Full 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014-2016 
Expanders 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
-0.005 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.004 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.014) 
0.010 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.013) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
Sample Size 1,544,933 1,532,577 1,532,577 931,656 1,442,214 1,391,155 1,341,734 
See notes from Appendix Table A2. 
Appendix Table A11 – Implied Effect of ACA on Probability of At Risk Drinking in the last 30 Days at Mean Pre-Treatment 
Uninsured Rate: Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
Drop 19-25 
Year Olds 
Drop States 
with Full 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014-2016 
Expanders 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.016** 
(0.005) 
0.014* 
(0.006) 
0.015* 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.016* 
(0.006) 
0.018* 
(0.007) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) 
0.015* 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
0.017* 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.019* 
(0.008) 
0.018 
(0.010) 
Sample Size 1,509,556 1,502,567 1,502,567 914,505 1,414,505 1,364,519 1,316,228 
See notes from Appendix Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A12 – Effects of ACA on Preventive Care and Risky Health Behavior Outcomes – All Regression Coefficients 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variables Checkup Flu Shot Pap Test Mammogram HIV Test Smoker 
Drinks per 
Month BMI 
Any 
Exercise 
Risky 
Drinking 
Medicaid Expansion 0.00274 0.00360 0.0249 0.00473 0.00618 -0.0153** -0.239 -0.0265 -0.00837 0.000977 
 
(0.0128) (0.0146) (0.0222) (0.0127) (0.00915) (0.00697) (0.508) (0.0913) (0.00979) (0.00663) 
Post * Pre-Treatment  0.136*** 0.0829 0.288** 0.0954*** 0.113*** 0.00722 1.766 -0.236 -0.00344 0.0757*** 
Uninsured (0.0394) (0.0794) (0.118) (0.0296) (0.0343) (0.0420) (2.378) (0.393) (0.0503) (0.0279) 
Medicaid Expansion *  0.0511 0.00821 -0.0803 -0.0222 -0.0112 0.0334 1.463 0.0112 0.0377 0.00573 
Post * Pre-Treatment  (0.0529) (0.0684) (0.106) (0.0556) (0.0353) (0.0326) (2.153) (0.494) (0.0514) (0.0328) 
Uninsured           
Female 0.0998*** 0.0653*** -- -- 0.0522*** -0.0397*** -11.07*** -0.553*** -0.0204*** -0.0976*** 
 
(0.00316) (0.00380) 
  
(0.00323) (0.00477) (0.256) (0.0515) (0.00221) (0.00311) 
Age 25-29 -0.0207*** -0.00319 0.116*** -0.0210*** 0.169*** 0.0660*** 0.255 1.604*** -0.0319*** 0.00464 
 
(0.00455) (0.00456) (0.0103) (0.00348) (0.00626) (0.00490) (0.400) (0.0417) (0.00257) (0.00457) 
Age 30-34 -0.00760** 0.00733* 0.0936*** -0.0314*** 0.230*** 0.0909*** -0.825** 2.515*** -0.0621*** -0.0339*** 
 
(0.00358) (0.00411) (0.0136) (0.00469) (0.00769) (0.00632) (0.374) (0.0470) (0.00254) (0.00404) 
Age 35-39 0.0140*** 0.00907** 0.0535*** 0.0182*** 0.231*** 0.0813*** -1.231*** 2.963*** -0.0784*** -0.0594*** 
 
(0.00356) (0.00348) (0.0144) (0.00549) (0.00996) (0.00499) (0.388) (0.0493) (0.00500) (0.00486) 
Age 40-44 0.0503*** 0.00883*** 0.0354* 0.333*** 0.197*** 0.0667*** -1.624*** 3.253*** -0.0952*** -0.0808*** 
 
(0.00524) (0.00295) (0.0179) (0.0107) (0.00994) (0.00561) (0.265) (0.0510) (0.00472) (0.00406) 
Age 45-49 0.0707*** 0.0299*** 0.0137 0.429*** 0.147*** 0.0681*** -2.344*** 3.319*** -0.108*** -0.105*** 
 
(0.00477) (0.00408) (0.0182) (0.0109) (0.0120) (0.00435) (0.325) (0.0387) (0.00502) (0.00574) 
Age 50-54 0.109*** 0.0722*** -0.0204 0.474*** 0.0779*** 0.0663*** -2.816*** 3.293*** -0.118*** -0.132*** 
 
(0.00385) (0.00569) (0.0165) (0.0112) (0.0116) (0.00432) (0.345) (0.0463) (0.00575) (0.00521) 
Age 55-59 0.148*** 0.126*** -0.0467*** 0.489*** 0.0142 0.0464*** -4.267*** 3.330*** -0.131*** -0.164*** 
 
(0.00610) (0.00532) (0.0157) (0.00964) (0.0101) (0.00336) (0.334) (0.0605) (0.00496) (0.00570) 
Age 60-64 0.193*** 0.184*** -0.0810*** 0.511*** -0.0360*** 0.00835** -4.896*** 3.233*** -0.137*** -0.188*** 
 
(0.00660) (0.00541) (0.0155) (0.0108) (0.0121) (0.00368) (0.327) (0.0556) (0.00478) (0.00631) 
Black 0.144*** -0.0273*** 0.0995*** 0.0874*** 0.222*** -0.0751*** -5.240*** 1.669*** -0.0309*** -0.0737*** 
 
(0.00270) (0.00436) (0.00618) (0.00479) (0.00790) (0.00919) (0.369) (0.0650) (0.00313) (0.00414) 
Hispanic 0.0339*** 0.00321 0.0562*** 0.0422*** 0.0157 -0.159*** -4.442*** 0.736*** -0.0252*** -0.0320*** 
 
(0.00448) (0.00612) (0.00371) (0.00514) (0.0168) (0.00625) (0.327) (0.105) (0.00374) (0.00418) 
-- CONTINUED -- 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variables Checkup Flu Shot Pap Test Mammogram HIV Test Smoker 
Drinks per 
Month BMI 
Any 
Exercise 
Risky 
Drinking 
Other 0.0293*** 0.0252*** -0.0606*** -0.000470 -0.0417** -0.0284*** -5.892*** -1.061*** -0.0447*** -0.0905*** 
 
(0.00353) (0.00509) (0.00964) (0.00456) (0.0172) (0.00522) (0.576) (0.145) (0.00406) (0.00560) 
Married 0.0272*** 0.0312*** 0.0206*** 0.0206*** -0.0978*** -0.0889*** -4.645*** 0.0795* -0.000268 -0.0651*** 
 
(0.00214) (0.00224) (0.00315) (0.00284) (0.00354) (0.00309) (0.244) (0.0445) (0.00169) (0.00190) 
High School Grad 0.0448*** 0.00949** 0.0189 0.0161** 0.0179** -0.0701*** -1.699*** 0.00593 0.0678*** -0.00454 
 
(0.00349) (0.00375) (0.0136) (0.00660) (0.00759) (0.0139) (0.275) (0.0415) (0.00404) (0.00314) 
Some College 0.0530*** 0.0441*** 0.0303** 0.0143** 0.0725*** -0.123*** -2.745*** 0.0587 0.126*** -0.00803* 
 
(0.00362) (0.00604) (0.0135) (0.00626) (0.00796) (0.0159) (0.304) (0.0478) (0.00423) (0.00404) 
College Grad 0.0541*** 0.110*** 0.0723*** 0.0299*** 0.0673*** -0.224*** -3.971*** -1.177*** 0.183*** -0.0219*** 
 
(0.00487) (0.00707) (0.0152) (0.00795) (0.00761) (0.0179) (0.312) (0.0830) (0.00705) (0.00458) 
No Children 0.00426*** 0.0178*** 0.0250*** -0.00576 0.0556*** 0.00620* -2.974*** 0.168*** -0.00508** -0.0413*** 
 
(0.00158) (0.00325) (0.00511) (0.00349) (0.00295) (0.00316) (0.151) (0.0289) (0.00196) (0.00199) 
One Child -0.00195 0.0222*** 0.0160*** -0.00983*** 0.0619*** -0.00924*** -2.966*** -0.0655 -0.00256 -0.0446*** 
 
(0.00230) (0.00393) (0.00375) (0.00363) (0.00360) (0.00246) (0.189) (0.0400) (0.00296) (0.00162) 
Two Children -0.0179*** 0.00845 0.00456 -0.0142*** 0.0642*** -0.0148*** -3.401*** 0.0661 -0.00563** -0.0565*** 
 
(0.00479) (0.00512) (0.00884) (0.00332) (0.00489) (0.00364) (0.315) (0.0642) (0.00257) (0.00253) 
Three Children -0.0281*** 0.00923* 0.000783 -0.0184** 0.0618*** -0.0233*** -3.385*** 0.254** -0.0134** -0.0716*** 
 
(0.00429) (0.00507) (0.00703) (0.00696) (0.00610) (0.00404) (0.619) (0.100) (0.00523) (0.00652) 
Four Children -0.0548*** -0.0205** -0.0154 -0.0205* 0.0541*** -0.0226*** -1.818** 0.289** -0.0265*** -0.0829*** 
 
(0.0124) (0.00772) (0.0196) (0.0104) (0.00782) (0.00606) (0.839) (0.108) (0.00525) (0.00749) 
Income 10k to less  -0.0120*** -0.0109*** 0.00533 -0.00612 0.00949* -0.00614 -0.194 0.264*** 0.00931*** 0.00470 
than 15k (0.00417) (0.00398) (0.00771) (0.00546) (0.00555) (0.00377) (0.315) (0.0742) (0.00303) (0.00365) 
Income 15k to less -0.0365*** -0.0152*** 0.0116 -0.00431 -0.00970 -0.0121** 1.100** -0.0797 0.0254*** 0.0248*** 
than 20k (0.00621) (0.00481) (0.00808) (0.00891) (0.00775) (0.00455) (0.506) (0.0952) (0.00450) (0.00410) 
Income 20k to less -0.0255*** -0.0191*** 0.0225** -0.00154 -0.0131 -0.0275*** 2.404*** -0.221*** 0.0470*** 0.0349*** 
than 25k (0.00323) (0.00326) (0.00895) (0.00574) (0.0108) (0.00562) (0.520) (0.0764) (0.00344) (0.00417) 
Income 25k to less -0.00907** -0.0193*** 0.0324*** 0.00910* -0.0356*** -0.0525*** 2.902*** -0.422*** 0.0651*** 0.0446*** 
than 35k (0.00361) (0.00475) (0.00734) (0.00478) (0.0114) (0.00820) (0.336) (0.0689) (0.00379) (0.00444) 
Income 35k to less 0.0188*** -0.0130** 0.0579*** 0.0227** -0.0441*** -0.0751*** 4.070*** -0.494*** 0.0929*** 0.0643*** 
than 50k (0.00554) (0.00610) (0.0117) (0.00875) (0.0125) (0.00829) (0.295) (0.0707) (0.00611) (0.00313) 
-- CONTINUED -- 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variables Checkup Flu Shot Pap Test Mammogram HIV Test Smoker 
Drinks per 
Month BMI 
Any 
Exercise 
Risky 
Drinking 
Income 50k to less 0.0430*** -0.00151 0.0812*** 0.0438*** -0.0534*** -0.0998*** 4.971*** -0.600*** 0.120*** 0.0795*** 
than 75k (0.00540) (0.00588) (0.0147) (0.00937) (0.0126) (0.0101) (0.386) (0.0702) (0.00745) (0.00297) 
Income more 0.0689*** 0.0320*** 0.113*** 0.0783*** -0.0426*** -0.129*** 7.718*** -1.152*** 0.165*** 0.115*** 
than 75k (0.00672) (0.00548) (0.0151) (0.00936) (0.0132) (0.0102) (0.377) (0.0873) (0.00674) (0.00310) 
Student 0.0323*** 0.0240*** -0.0996*** -0.0296*** -0.0826*** -0.0880*** -2.350*** -0.739*** 0.0486*** -0.0167** 
 
(0.00599) (0.00397) (0.00854) (0.00398) (0.00357) (0.00427) (0.531) (0.0889) (0.00480) (0.00683) 
Unemployed -0.0487*** -0.0483*** -0.0349*** -0.0375*** 0.0340*** 0.0672*** 1.135*** -0.00218 0.0233*** 0.00564* 
 
(0.00387) (0.00237) (0.00645) (0.00550) (0.00229) (0.00354) (0.267) (0.0445) (0.00258) (0.00283) 
Unemployment Rate -0.000848 -0.00135 -0.00224 -0.000225 9.48e-06 -0.00204* -0.366*** 0.0193 0.00495*** -0.000330 
 
(0.00226) (0.00190) (0.00358) (0.00285) (0.00163) (0.00116) (0.120) (0.0156) (0.00175) (0.00146) 
Exchange -0.000773 0.00240 -0.00400 0.00301 0.0141*** 0.0128*** 0.127 -0.0764* -0.000343 -0.00785 
 
(0.00469) (0.00559) (0.0105) (0.00598) (0.00389) (0.00431) (0.285) (0.0417) (0.00505) (0.00498) 
Exchange Glitches -0.00666 -0.00363 0.0130 0.00145 -0.000506 -0.00589 0.0867 -0.00151 0.00607 0.0129*** 
 
(0.00633) (0.00585) (0.0108) (0.00724) (0.00610) (0.00492) (0.238) (0.0646) (0.00522) (0.00483) 
Constant 0.443*** 0.228*** 0.524*** 0.0705*** 0.283*** 0.478*** 28.55*** 26.35*** 0.501*** 0.358*** 
 
(0.0311) (0.0248) (0.0318) (0.0242) (0.0266) (0.0187) (1.733) (0.249) (0.0218) (0.0183) 
           Observations 1,577,507 1,497,214 441,224 443,970 1,446,305 1,547,824 1,510,877 1,503,710 1,532,577 1,502,567 
R-squared 0.068 0.055 0.054 0.274 0.117 0.111 0.046 0.072 0.082 0.072 
See notes from Appendix Table A2. 
           
